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EVERYTHING’S BIGGER IN TEXAS:
EXCEPT THE MEDMAL SETTLEMENTS
TOM BAKER, ERIC HELLAND, AND JONATHAN KLICK1
***
Recent work using Texas closed claim data finds that physicians are rarely
required to use personal assets in medical malpractice settlements even
when plaintiffs secure judgments above the physician's insurance limits. In
equilibrium, this should lead physicians to purchase less insurance.
Qualitative research on the behavior of plaintiffs suggests that there is a
norm under which plaintiffs agree not to pursue personal assets as long as
defendants are not grossly underinsured. This norm operates as a soft
constraint on physicians. All other things equal, while physicians want to
lower their coverage, they do not want to violate the norm and trigger an
attack on their personal assets. This constraint should be less effective
when physicians have other ways to shield their assets, such as through
large personal bankruptcy exemptions like those available in Texas.
Settlement data from the National Practitioner Data Bank indicate that
settlements in Texas are abnormally low, just as they are in other
jurisdictions with unlimited homestead exemptions in bankruptcy.
Consistent with theory, we find that more generous exemptions are also
associated with lower insurance prices and lower levels of insurance
coverage. These results suggest that the large "haircuts" and low
insurance limits observed in the Texas data may be driven by Texas's
generous bankruptcy provisions. At a minimum, Texas is not generally
representative of other jurisdictions. This weakens the case for
extrapolating conclusions from Texas data to other jurisdictions.
***
I. INTRODUCTION
Academic theory, conventional wisdom, and empirical reality are
orthogonal to one another when it comes to medical malpractice. In first
year law classes, we teach that tort law induces doctors to conform to the
prevailing standard of care.2 Political rhetoric focuses on medical
1
The authors wish to thank Daniel Baltuch and Ben Pyle for research
assistance and Bernie Black for comments on an earlier draft.
2
See, e.g., Richard Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 253-
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malpractice criseses, doctor shortages, and the costs of defensive
medicine.3 The data suggest that while medical malpractice law does little
to properly incentivize doctors4 and is an expensive way to compensate
victims5 on the whole, it adds relatively little to the aggregate cost of
healthcare.6
A series of papers using fairly comprehensive7 data from the Texas
Department of Insurance (TDI)8 on closed medical malpractice claims in
the state9 adds another degree of separation between theory, public
242 (9th ed. 2008).
3
For a discussion of this rhetoric, see Tom Baker, The Medical Malpractice
Myth (2005).
4
For a recent review of the evidence, see Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the
Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 100 (2011).
5
See David M. Studdert, et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006)
(reporting that in a random sample of 1,452 closed medical malpractice claims,
payments to lawyers accounted for almost half of the expenditures); This number
is in line with that reported by Patricia Danzon which compares it with an
overhead figure for first party insurance closer to 10 percent. Patricia Danzon,
Liability for Medical Malpractice, 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECON. 1339, 1369
(2000).
6
Even studies with the largest estimates place medical malpractice costs at
less than 3 percent of total healthcare spending in the U.S. See e.g., Michelle M.
Mello, et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1569, 1569 (2010) (placing the share at 2.4 percent). See also, Darius Lakdawalla
& Seth Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 15383 (2009) (using sophisticated
techniques to account for the endogeneity between health care spending and
medical malpractice and still finds that tort awards account for less than 5 percent
of the growth in medical spending since 2000).
7
The primary limitation in the TDI data is that there is limited or no
information on small claims. Claims involving payments up to $10,000 (in
nominal terms) are not individually reported, and claims involving payments
between $10,001 and $24,999 do not require detailed information in the associated
filing. For example, filings in the latter category contain no information on the
underlying injury. For all observations, one significant problem with the TDI
dataset is that it contains no information on physician specialty.
8
For annual descriptive reports of these data, see Texas Liability Insurance
Closed
Claim
Annual
Reports,
TEX.
DEP’T
OF
INS.,
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/report4.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
9
For details on this dataset, see Bernard Black, et al., Stability Not Crisis:
Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988- 2002, 2 J. EMP. LEG. STUD.
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perception, and reality in this context. Given the ubiquity of non-risk-rated
medical malpractice insurance,10 for liability to generate incentives for
physician care, there must be a non-trivial possibility that liability can
exceed insurance limits.11 Physicians themselves appear to fear exposing
their personal assets to medical malpractice liability.12 Yet, if the Texas
data are representative, physicians rarely pay anything above their
insurance limits in settlements, even if a case generates a judgment that
exceeds those limits.13 That is, plaintiff awards above insurance limits
generally receive a “haircut” bringing them down to a level where a
defendant doctor does not have to use any personal assets to satisfy the
judgment.14
The Texas data present a puzzle. If the risk of an above limit
payment is really so small, why do physicians worry about liability at all?
What’s more, given that Texas has no regulation requiring a minimum
level of medical malpractice insurance,15 why do physicians buy as much
insurance as they do? In equilibrium, the fact that plaintiffs do not pursue
personal assets to satisfy above limit judgments should lead physicians to
207 (2005).
10
For a discussion of this peculiarity, see Frank A. Sloan, Experience Rating:
Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance?, 80 Aᴍ. Eᴄᴏɴ. Rᴇᴠ. 128
(1990).
11
Physicians may be incentivized by reputational concerns that are affected by
the litigation system even if they do not bear the direct costs of settlements and
judgments. For some evidence of these reputational concerns, see Eric Helland &
Gia Lee, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Website: Disclosure’s Impact on
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 Aᴍ Lᴀᴡ Eᴄᴏɴ Rᴇᴠ 423 (2010).
12
Internet searches yield numerous business entities advertising asset
protection services aimed at physicians, invoking fears regarding medical
malpractice
claims.
For
example,
see
Capital
Asset,
Inc.,
http://www.bulletproofasset.com/physicians.htm (accessed October 11, 2013).
Another telling indicator of the demand for asset protection services among
physicians is the existence of the book, now in its second edition, Robert J. Mintz,
ASSET PROTECTION FOR PHYSICIANS AND BUSINESS OWNERS (2nd ed. 2010).
13
David A. Hyman, Bernard S. Black, & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy
Limit and the Duty to Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. Eᴍᴘɪʀɪᴄᴀʟ Lᴇɢ. Sᴛᴜᴅ. 48
(2011).
14
David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, & William
M. Sage, Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003 4 J. Eᴍᴘɪʀɪᴄᴀʟ Lᴇɢ. Sᴛᴜᴅ. 3, 7 (2007).
15
While some states do have such regulations, Texas is not among them. See
American Medical Association, STATE LAWS MANDATING MINIMUM LEVEL OF
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (2012).
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reduce their insurance coverage.
The Texas results, and the questions they raise, relate closely to
earlier work done by Tom Baker on the topic of “blood money. 16” In that
work, attorneys suggested that plaintiffs are reluctant to pursue a
defendant’s personal assets (blood money) both because it is relatively
difficult to get at personal assets and because of the view that it is unfair,
except in certain circumstances, to go after those assets. One implication of
these findings is that, all other things equal, the easier it is for a defendant
to shield her assets, the less likely it is that a plaintiff will pursue blood
money. Subsequent work on the blood money phenomenon claims that
generous bankruptcy exemptions are among the most important
impediments keeping plaintiffs from pursuing larger settlements.17
In this article, we pick up some of the open questions raised by the
work on haircuts in the Texas medical malpractice data in light of the
qualitative work on blood money. After reviewing both sets of literature in
section 2, we provide a simple model of the equilibrium behavior of a
physician in choosing her insurance level in light of these literatures in
section 3. In section 4, we briefly describe the homestead exemptions that
exist in each state. In section 5, we outline the empirical evidence that
supports our model. In section 6, we show that settlements are
systematically lower in states with more generous homestead exemptions
using comprehensive data on medical malpractice payments from the
National Practitioner Data Bank. To link this result to our model, we
provide evidence from a nationally representative survey showing that
medical malpractice insurance prices are systematically lower in states
with more generous exemptions, consistent with a model where the
demand for insurance declines when bankruptcy law provides an alternate
vehicle for protecting assets. Lastly, we analyze insurance policies from a
database of an insolvent insurer showing that doctors choose lower policy
limits in states with more generous bankruptcy protections, further
bolstering our basic claims. Section 7 discusses the robustness and
limitations of our results, and section 8 concludes.
In addition to verifying the importance of bankruptcy protections
to tort law in action, our results suggest that at least some of the findings of
the papers using the Texas closed claim data may be specific to regimes
with large bankruptcy exemptions like Texas. Given that, it may not be
16

Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 Lᴀᴡ & Sᴏᴄ’ʏ Rᴇᴠ. 275 (2001).
17
Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 Wᴀsʜ. & Lᴇᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ.
603 (2006).
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reasonable to expect that haircuts will be as common or as large in states
where asset protection is more difficult given the propensity of doctors to
buy more medical malpractice insurance coverage in such states. Even if
doubts remain about causality in the relationship we study, it seems clear
that something makes Texas peculiar,18 limiting the value of using the TDI
data to draw conclusions about the state of medical malpractice liability
more generally. Concerns about unobserved heterogeneity of this type
should lead researchers to focus on datasets that allow for better research
designs that exploit natural experiments and more cross- jurisdiction
comparisons.19
II. BLOOD MONEY AND BANKRUPTCY
The research on blood money grew out of a qualitative study of
personal injury lawyers in Florida and Connecticut conducted in the mid1990s. First focused on the relationship between tort claims and liability
insurance,20 the study went on to explore the circumstances in which
plaintiffs seek more than just insurance money from individual defendants.
That question touched such an emotional chord among the lawyers that it
became a central focus of the interviews, with plaintiffs’ and defense
lawyers alike distancing themselves from “what we call blood money,
instead of insurance company money.”21 The defense lawyers emphasized
the extent to which they protected their clients from having to pay blood
money. The plaintiffs’ lawyers emphasized the extent to which they
acculturated their clients to the strong norm that plaintiffs are supposed “to
take it [money] from an insurance company as opposed to an individual.”22
In explaining this norm, the lawyers identified moral and practical
considerations. Except in three kinds of circumstances to be explained
shortly, going after “blood money” is ethically and morally problematic for

18

Texas is peculiar for many reasons. See, e.g., Barney Smith’s Toilet Seat Art
Museum, Roadside America, http://www.roadsideamerica.com/story/6166. We
focus solely on those related to medical malpractice in this article.
19
See generally, Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Credibility
Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the
Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 2, 2010 at 3.
20
Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the
Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 214 (1998).
21
Baker, supra note 16, at 281.
22
Id. at 283.
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both plaintiffs and their lawyers.23 In addition, the lawyers reported that
there are serious practical hurdles: “it is easier to collect from an
insurance company than it is to go against the individual and try to garnish
wages, foreclose on a home, as well as other things that most people aren’t
interested in doing, whereas the insurance companies, they’re like a
bank.”24
As the lawyers reported, the legal rule regarding the liability
insurer’s “duty to settle” reinforces the practice of accepting the available
insurance money in settlement of the claim.25 This legal rule obligates an
insurer to “to make reasonable settlement decisions that protect the insured
from judgments in excess of the policy limits.”26 An insurer that breaches
this duty must pay the full amount of any resulting judgment,
notwithstanding the fact that liability insurance policies place limits on the
amounts that insurers are contractually obligated to pay. This insurance law
rule and the practical difficulties of collecting significant amounts of
money from individuals combine to create a very strong incentive for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle even very serious liability claims for the
insurance policy limits, sometimes with the hope that the insurance
company will unreasonably refuse to accept the offer, thereby “setting up”
the insurance company to pay much more money after trial.27
With or without this hope, the lawyers report that the moral and
practical considerations against blood money create such a strong social
practice of accepting the available insurance money as payment in full that
it takes a great deal of effort for a plaintiff to persuade a defense lawyer
that she or he is actually serious about demanding the payment of blood
money in an ordinary negligence case.28 For most plaintiffs in most cases
against ordinary middle class defendants, the choice is clear, as explained
23

Id. at 284-85. Interesting, the few plaintiffs’ lawyers who actively resisted
the no blood money norm (while acknowledging that it existed) pointed out that
lawyers who refuse to go after blood money may well be violating their ethical
obligation to serve as zealous advocates for their clients. Id. at 287.
24
Id. at 285. See also Id. at 289 (an explanation of how going after
blood money can be harder and take longer than just collecting from
insurance company).
25
Id. at 291-92.
26
Principles of Liability Insurance Project (AM. LAW INST., Draft No. 3,
2012).
27
Baker, supra note 16, at 293-94. See also David A. Hyman, Bernard S.
Black & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy Limit and the Duty to Settle: Evidence
from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 48 (2011).
28
Baker, supra note 16, at 291.
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in the following statement from a plaintiffs’ lawyer who reported that he
had never collected blood money:
This woman is coming in tomorrow; she has to make the
decision. Does she want to pursue this guy on a personal
basis? It’s not going to make any difference, because …
the guy who caused all this happened to be a teacher, an
elementary musical [sic] teacher. Makes about $45,000 a
year; he’s got three kids. He’s got no equity in his house,
and he’s got an old car. If she pursues him, what’s going to
happen is, she’ll get a judgment. It’s going to be for a lot
more than $100,000, and he’s going to go into bankruptcy.
And when he goes into bankruptcy, he’s going to keep his
house, he’s going to keep his car, and he’s going to keep
under the statute, $15,000. You can’t tap into his IRA, if he
has one, his 401K if he’s got one for school, for his group,
his employment. So what advantage is there for the client
to do that? Plus, she can get $100,000 now, or she can wait
four years and get $100,000. So, for that reason I’ve never
been in a situation where I’ve taken personal liability.29
The lawyers reported three circumstances in which pursuing blood
money is not a breach of the norm: when the defendant clearly deserves
punishment,30 when the plaintiff died or suffered various serious injuries
and the defendant’s conduct was more than merely negligent,31 and when
29

Id. at 289.
Id. at 298 (“Parents and relatives of people who are killed by drunk[en]
drivers want blood. They really want blood. I forgot what question of yours initiated
this, but in those cases, the clients themselves have an interest in gouging, to make
the point to the person and to have the word get out, usually to other youths that
‘Holy shit! Jones’s father lost his house.’”).
31
Id. at 299 (“Generally, ... tragic injuries. I’m thinking of one where a young
kid was rendered a quadriplegic in a swimming pool accident, and the people were
actually supervising a party, like a high school graduation party or such, and they
were actually there and they were allowing drinking; kids got crazy as teenagers ...,
and the poor youngster ended up in a wheelchair. And the homeowners coverage, I
think, was $300,000, which obviously didn’t even touch the value of the case, and
we did attach property there because the people ... insisted on it, and we did get the
payment because it was a fairly nice house and there was a good amount of money
there; but we generally, and maybe it’s just a personal preference, but we don’t like
doing it.”).
30
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the defendant failed to purchase enough insurance.32 The latter
circumstance is what we focus on in this quantitative research. It is an
imprecise, presumably local, norm:
How much is enough? My interviews do not provide a
clear answer, but they do provide a way to think about it.
The minimum is whatever it takes to claim, credibly, that
you have satisfied your moral obligation to insure.
Ordinary people have an obligation to purchase insurance
in ordinary amounts. Wealthy people have an obligation to
purchase insurance in larger amounts.33
In the years since this qualitative research was published, legal
scholarship has advanced the understanding of the blood money story in
two main ways. First, Steven Gilles took the main empirical insight of the
blood money research, combined it with Lynn LoPucki’s “death of
liability” idea,34 and advanced the thesis that, at least for ordinary middle
class individuals, ours is a “Judgment-Proof Society.”35 A host of legal
rules that protect middle class incomes and assets from execution combine
to make liability insurance the only significant asset available to tort
plaintiffs. Gilles’ exhaustive march through these legal rules provided
firmer ground for the earlier, admittedly impressionistic observation by
Baker that “for claims against all but the wealthiest individuals and
organizations, liability insurance is a de facto element of tort liability.”36
Second, the team working with the Texas medical malpractice
32

Id. at 297 (“If a lawyer or doctor chooses to go bare, which is an economic
decision to put more money in their own pockets and not pay their premiums, then
I probably would go after them because that’s wrong, because they are now not
protecting– it’s now not just being negligent, they’re making a conscious decision
that if they screw up, they’re not going to protect their client or their patient. And
they did that so that they could make more money.”).
33
Id. at 296-97.
34
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE. L. J. 1 (1996).
35
Gilles, supra note 17, at 607 (“This Article is about how our laws have
made being judgment-proof the rule rather than the exception; about what this
implies for the standard deterrence, corrective justice, and loss-spreading accounts
of tort law; and about whether anything should be done to lower the legal barriers
to enforcing and collecting tort judgments from individual tortfeasors”).
36
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, Tort Law and Liability Insurance at 295
(Gerhard Wagner ed. 2005).
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closed claim data has used those data to test the blood money hypothesis
quantitatively. They analyzed whether doctors ever paid blood money in
medical malpractice claims in Texas. Their answer – almost never, not
even in cases with big jury verdicts – supported the qualitative research,
with three interesting extensions.37
First, because doctors have incomes that are well above middle
class, the explanation for this result cannot rest entirely on the practical
bankruptcy protection explanations provided by the Connecticut lawyers.
(Gilles would point to trust law.38 The Connecticut lawyers would claim
that morality also plays a role.) Second, the Texas data also include
payments made in cases that went to trial, allowing the researchers to
report that doctors rarely paid blood money even after losing a big case at
trial.39 Heretofore the blood money story had focused exclusively on pretrial settlements. The finding that doctors did not have to pay blood money
even when the jury verdict greatly exceeded the medical malpractice
insurance policy limit significantly strengthened the thesis of the original
qualitative research. If doctors regularly make post-verdict settlements that
give the plaintiffs only the insurance money, plaintiffs have little hope of
collecting blood money from a pre-trial settlement.
This dynamic explains the third, initially surprising extension of
the Texas researchers: Texas doctors buy insurance policies with much
lower limits than scholars had previously believed, and the amount of
insurance that the doctors bought declined in real terms over the years the
researchers studied. Taking the blood money story seriously, however, this
result is not surprising. Why should physicians buy more insurance than
they need? Once doctors buy enough insurance to satisfy the “no blood
money” norm and the liability insurance requirements of their contracting
partners (most significantly, hospitals), any additional insurance provides a
benefit only to patients who sue them. Within the dominant world view of
the medical profession, patients who sue are the enemy, not a group
deserving of extra protection from physicians’ voluntary purchase of
37

See Hyman, supra note 13, at 48.
Gilles, supra note 17, at 635-42.
39
Hyman et al., supra note 13, at 51. See also, Hyman et al., supra note 14 at
7 (“Post-verdict settlements were often at or below policy limits even when the
adjusted verdict exceeded these limits. In the 214 “single-payer” cases for which
we have data on policy limits, we estimate that policy limits explain at least 73
percent of the aggregate haircut ($71 million/$97 million). In single-payer cases
with adjusted verdicts that exceeded the policy limits, 92 percent (71/77) received
a haircut”).
38
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insurance in amounts that exceed the norm.40
We investigate these dynamics below, developing a model of
insurance choice for a doctor rationally reacting to an environment where
plaintiffs do not pursue blood money except in cases of egregious
underinsuring.
III. SIMPLE MODEL
In choosing a medical malpractice insurance policy, price and the
amount of coverage41 will generally drive a physician’s choice.42 These
two factors are not independent since an individual can always purchase a
policy with higher limits if she is willing to pay a higher price. This
decision process might be constrained, however. Some states regulate
minimum coverage levels43, and even more often, hospitals will set their
own higher requirements as a pre-condition for being able to practice at the
hospital.44 For simplicity, we ignore these constraints in the theoretical
model that follows45, but we include the effect of state regulations in the
empirical work presented below.
We do, however, consider another influence in a physician’s policy
choice. In documenting the blood money phenomenon, Baker found
qualitative evidence that plaintiffs were more likely to go after personal
assets if the defendant consciously chose to underinsure.46 The interview
subjects in that study suggested that the definition of adequate insurance is
not precise, but is instead driven by potentially evolving norms that are
determined contextually. Respondents also suggested that, all other things
40

Timothy Marjoribanks, Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, Ann G. Lawthers &
Lynn M. Peterson, Physicians’ Discourses on Malpractice and the Meaning of
Medical Malpractice, 37 J. HEALTH AND SOC. BEHAVIOR 163 (1996).
41
We do not distinguish between per-occurrence limits and aggregate annual
limits. The intuition captured in the model below follows for both kinds of limits.
42
We ignore other terms of second order importance, such as consent to settle
clauses and deductibles since they do not affect our analysis.
43
See generally National Conference of State Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/medical-liability-malpractice-2010legislation.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (providing an overview of state
regulations regarding medical malpractice limits).
44
See Michelle M. Mello, Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance: A
Primer, 8 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. RES. SYNTHESIS REP. 1, 3 (2006).
45
Including constraints of this type in the simple model presented below
would not qualitatively change the conclusions.
46
Baker, Blood Money, supra note 16, at 296-98.
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equal, wealthier individuals were expected to maintain more insurance
coverage than individuals with more limited means. This suggests that
doctors will likely consider these norms when choosing their policy limits,
although, given the inherent fuzziness of these norms, they will tend to
operate as soft influences rather than hard constraints.
To formalize the doctor’s decision process, we assume that the
individual chooses only the policy limit, which in turn affects the price
paid for the policy. All other terms of the policy are fixed. Further, we
assume there are no legal or professional regulations that set policy limits.
Lastly, we assume that the terms of the physician’s policy do not affect the
level of harm suffered by a plaintiff47, but we do allow the chosen limits to
affect the cost borne by the physician after an adverse event for which the
physician may be held liable. We allow for this both directly, with the
physician automatically being indemnified for any cost below the limit,
and indirectly with the probability that a plaintiff will seek blood money
for losses above the limit being an inverse function of the policy limit
itself. That is, all other things equal, the likelihood a plaintiff seeks blood
money will be lower as the insurance limit is higher. This indirect effect
captures the norm described above.
For our model, the physician chooses L to minimize the sum of the
cost of her policy C(L) which is a function of the policy limit and the
expected out of pocket costs she expects to pay to plaintiffs. The expected
payment out of personal assets is a random variable, and so its expectation
is expressed as the integral of the potential harm H(x) multiplied by the
associated probability distribution f(x,L). As suggested above, while we do
not allow the harm suffered by the plaintiff to vary as a function of the
policy limit, we do allow the likelihood that the physician must bear those
losses via a settlement to be a function of the policy limit. Specifically, we
assume that as L increases, f(x,L) declines.
The physician then solves the following:

The range of the integral goes from the policy limit (L), since the policy
covers any amount up to the limit, to infinity.48 To solve this problem, the
47

We disallow, for example, the potential for moral hazard.
More realistically, the upper bound is some measure of total available
assets, perhaps including future income streams. The results that follow do not
48
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individual takes the first derivative of the expression with respect to L and
sets it equal to zero.49 This leads to the following first order condition50:

Rearranged:

This provides the standard result that the individual increases her insurance
limit up to the point where the marginal cost (i.e., how much it costs to
increase the limit by one dollar) is exactly equal to the marginal benefit. In
this case, the marginal benefit is equal to the likelihood of facing an
incremental harm just equal to the chosen policy limit and the doctor being
able to satisfy his obligation for that additional harm through his insurance
policy as opposed to being required to pay out of pocket, minus the
expected savings garnered from not having to pay for above limit harms
(because the increase in the limit lowered the likelihood of violating the
underinsurance norm).
We note an interesting implication of this model. If we were to
take from the haircuts literature that individual doctors are very unlikely to
ever pay out of pocket to settle a claim, this would imply that at least the
first element of the marginal benefit is zero. That is, if plaintiffs virtually
never seek to collect damages exceeding the insurance limits, there is no
benefit to extending the limits to cover an incremental harm. This suggests
that a doctor’s decision regarding coverage limits, ignoring regulatory
requirements, will depend on the degree to which plaintiffs are willing to
seek blood money due to the doctor’s decision to underinsure.
What constitutes an adequate level of insurance is unclear.
Interviews with lawyers suggest that it depends on the defendant’s wealth
and a reasonable expectation of likely damages. Doctors, especially those
engaging in risky practices, appear to be held to a high standard in this
regard.51
There appears, however, to be a tension between these qualitative
qualitatively depend on which upper bound is used.
49
We assume that the relevant second order conditions are satisfied.
50
See Akira Takayama, Analytical Methods in Economics, at 200 (1993) for
an illustration of differentiation of a definite integral.
51
Baker, Blood Money, supra note 16, at 296-298.
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impressions and the findings of the haircuts literature. Specifically, in the
Texas Department of Insurance database, doctors effectively never pay out
of pocket to satisfy judgments or settlement amounts. In the period 1990–
2003, in the 9,525 cases with a paid medical malpractice claim, Zeiler et al.
find that 98.5 percent of claims settle at or below the policy limit.52 Even
among those few cases where payments to plaintiffs exceed the limit,
physicians paid out of pocket less than half the time. In dollar terms,
throughout the entire sample, physicians paid less than $12 million total.53
In expectation, this amounts to about $30 per year for the average
physician.54
These numbers could be consistent with the qualitative findings.
Perhaps Texas doctors were particularly risk averse, leading them to insure
at exceedingly high levels. Zeiler et al., however, found that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, Texas doctors generally carried policies with limits
below $1 million in nominal terms and did not increase the amount of
coverage to keep pace with inflation.55 Perhaps conventional wisdom
overstates the real exposure faced by doctors, with Texas physicians doing
a relatively good job calibrating their coverage to actual awards and
settlements by holding policies with limits under the million dollar mark.
This, too, is belied by the Texas data. Hyman et al. find that, on average,
plaintiffs recover amounts well below what juries award. In a given case
that proceeds to a judgment, the TDI data for the 1988–2003 period show
haircuts of almost 30 percent. Because cases with larger verdicts are more
likely to be subjected to a haircut and the haircuts themselves are generally
larger when awards are bigger, more than 50 percent of money awarded is
not collected by plaintiffs.56 While some of the haircut arises due to
statutory limits on damages and judicial reductions, Hyman et al. estimate
that at least 73 percent of the total award reduction results from policy
limits.57 It would seem that physicians, at least those covered by the Texas
data, systematically underinsure if jury verdicts are a reliable guide to what
52
Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David A. Hyman, and
William M. Sage, Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments:
Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEG. STUD. S9, S10 (2007).
53
Id. at S25.
54
Zeiler et al find that in the period 1990-2003, physicians paid a total $11.8
million above policy limits out of pocket (s25). Table 2 suggests that in that period,
there were, on average, 27,747 doctors in Texas, leading to an average per doctor
annual exposure of $30.38.
55
Id. at S41.
56
Hyman, supra note 14, at 28.
57
Id. at 7.
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is considered adequate insurance, yet this does not appear to regularly
trigger a plaintiff’s willingness to seek blood money.
Work by Stephen Gilles offers a potential explanation for the large
haircuts observed in the Texas data. Gilles suggests that asset protection
mechanisms, especially generous bankruptcy exemptions, effectively make
defendants judgment-proof.58 That is, even for individuals like physicians
who likely have non-trivial personal assets, it is often quite easy to make
those assets non-collectible.59 After making this insight, Gilles raises the
question we flag above: namely why does anyone buy liability insurance if
asset protection is available for a defendant to make herself judgmentproof?60
Gilles’ answer is that, while available asset protection strategies
can make an individual mostly judgment-proof, complete asset protection
is not possible, leading Gilles to conclude that individuals buy less liability
insurance than they would in the absence of asset protection measures, but
they still buy some insurance above and beyond mandated minimums.
Gilles suggests that the blood money norm – at least with respect to only
pursuing a defendant’s personal assets when the defendant is not
adequately insured – has very little to do with fairness and much more to
do with the relative difficulty of getting access to such assets.61
If Gilles is correct, we should observe that individuals
systematically purchase less insurance when asset protection is easier,
since they can deduce that strong asset protection measures will lead
plaintiffs to settle for the amount of an insurance policy limit, even if it is
inadequate. Homestead exemptions in state bankruptcy laws provide a
major source of asset protection, according to Gilles.62 These insights may
provide a partial explanation for the large haircuts and low insurance limits
observed in the work using the TDI data, given that Texas had an unlimited
homestead exemption throughout the period analyzed in the relevant set of
papers.
IV. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
Individuals seeking to remove their debt obligations have two
separate and mutually exclusive personal bankruptcy procedures in the
58

Gilles, supra note 17, at 624.
Id. at 606.
60
Id. at 662-65.
61
Id. at 666.
62
Id. at 630.
59
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United States: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. The main difference between the
two is that Chapter 7 requires payment from assets, but once assets are
exhausted debtors have no claim on the bankrupt’s future income. By
contrast Chapter 13 bankruptcy requires repayment from future income,
although debts are still reduced commensurate with the individual’s
income.63 The key factor for our analysis is that bankruptcy, particularly
chapter 7 bankruptcy, ends all efforts to collect debt related to personal
injury torts such as medical malpractice.64
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy many states exempt certain assets which
are protected from creditors. Typically this includes clothing, household
goods and perhaps a vehicle and, most importantly for our purposes, in
several states, homestead exemptions that allow a party to keep all or part
of the equity in a home. Although reforms in 2005 limited the protection
available for recently acquired homestead equity, these reforms only apply
to a small part of the data we examine and, nevertheless, in most
circumstances individuals can still avail themselves of the exemption.65
We provide details on state homestead exemptions during the period
covered by our datasets, 1988-2008 in Table 1 below. We categorize states
as having zero exemption, a partial exemption, and an unlimited
exemption.
We focus primarily on states with unlimited homestead exemptions
because an unlimited exemption is the same everywhere and it is
63

Although most of our discussion in this paper focuses on Chapter 7
bankruptcy prior to the 2005 bankruptcy reform anecdotal evidence suggests that
doctors seeking to reduce a judgment in excess of insurance, if any, could still
reduce their expected losses under Chapter 13 since the payments were based on
ability to pay. In one example a hypothetical 6 million dollar judgment against a
bare doctor cited by Foodman & Associates in 2005 could result in 5 years of
payments of $10,000 a year for a physician earning $200,000 a year.
Moreover there are other methods for using the bankruptcy system to
reduce or eliminate judgments. One of the more extreme is intentional divorce in
which the doctor divorces their partner and generously gives up all the family
assets in the divorce only to remarry at a later date. This may seem extreme and the
stuff of situation comedy; at least on the last score it is. See for example the 2003
comedic play, “Going Bare” by Mary Jane Taegel in which an obstetrician who
has dropped his liability coverage receives a $4.2 million judgment, and conspires
with his wife to get a divorce to protect their assets. Hilarity ensues.
64
Gilles, supra note 17, at 648-50 (discussing the relationship between
bankruptcy and tort judgments during the time period that matches most closely to
the data used here and in the set of papers using the TDI data).
65
Id. at 655 (discussing how most individuals can still take advantage of the
homestead exemption).
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qualitatively different from partial exemption or no exemption. An
unlimited exemption protects all equity in a home from creditors. By
contrast, states with partial exemptions vary widely in their levels.66 For
example the $10,000 exemption in North Carolina provides much less
protection than the $100,000 exemption in Idaho, and even that relatively
generous $100,000 exemption does not provide a doctor the means to
shield significant wealth provided by the unlimited exemption granted in
nine states (see Table 1). Moreover, because of the clarity of the unlimited
homestead exemption, bankruptcy proceedings in those nine states are
often very quick, typically taking around 90 days.67

Table 1: State Homestead Exemptions
Homestead
State
Exemption
Years in Effect
AK
Partial
1988-2008
AL
Partial
1988-2008
AR
Unlimited
1988-2008
AZ
Partial
1988-2008
CA
Partial
1988-2008
CO
Partial
1988-2008
CT
0
1988-1994
CT
Partial
1994-2008
DC
0
1988-2001
DC
Unlimited
2001-2008
DE
0
1988-2001
DE
Partial
2001-2008
FL
Unlimited
1988-2008
Federal Partial
1988-2008
GA
Partial
1988-2008
HI
Partial
1988-2008
66

See Jeffrey Traczynski, Divorce Rates and Bankruptcy Exemption Levels in
the United States, 54 J. L. & ECON. 751, 762-63 (2011) (showing tables with
specific amounts of the exemptions in 1989, 1995, and 2005).
67
Maureen Glabman, New Bankruptcy Law: Blip or Blow for Florida
Physicians? FLORIDA MEDICAL BUSINESS, reprinted in SINGERXENOS,
http://www.singerxenos.com/pages/newsprint/fmbbankruptcy.html (last visited
Aug 18, 2016).

2016

IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
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Unlimited
Partial
Partial
Partial
Unlimited
Partial
Partial
Partial
0
Partial
Partial
Unlimited
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
0
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Unlimited
Partial
0
0
Partial
Partial
Unlimited
Partial
Unlimited
Partial

1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-1993
1997-2001
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
198-2001
2002-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
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VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
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1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008

Source: Elias, S., Renuauer, A., and Leonard, R. How to File for Bankruptcy,
various editions Berkeley, Calif.: Nolo Press 1988-2008

Prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 Act, there was no income test for Chapter 7, so an
individual could discharge debts without a claim on future income,
regardless of how high that income is. In effect, this allowed bankrupt
individuals to protect almost all of their other assets in states with
unlimited homestead exemptions, by simply taking non-exempt assets and
using them to pay down a mortgage or buy a larger house.68
In fact the threat of bankruptcy is also rumored to play an
important role in settlement negotiations in states with unlimited
exemptions. For example, the Florida Medical Business letter reported that,
in Florida, which has an unlimited exemption:
“Bankruptcy [is] a hammer for bare doctors,: according to
Marc Singer, a Coral Gables. “We’ve used the threat of
bankruptcy in about 100 cases to help achieve reasonable
settlements with plaintiff attorneys.”69
Indeed, the Florida legislature allowed doctors to go without insurance
68

There are limits on the timing of such asset reclassification but these are
typically fairly short and for medical malpractice cases which can take
considerable time to resolve allow doctors who suspect they are facing a large
liability judgment plenty of time to reclassify assets before the judgment is
recorded. See Glabman, supra note 67, (discussing the implications for the 2005
Act on physicians’ ability to protect assets). Case law in a number of states has
also found that debts expunged by bankruptcy are still the legal obligation of the
insurance company so that even if debt was discharged by bankruptcy the
insurance company still had to pay. See Matter of Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th
Cir. 1993) in which a Florida doctor’s judgment was expunged. The Court found
that the despite the bankruptcy the doctor insurer still had a legal obligation to pay
the judgment up to the policy limit.
69
See Glabman, supra note 67.
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starting in 1987 (allowing them to post a bond instead).
Following the 2005 Act, debtors can no longer simply choose the
type of bankruptcy they wish to pursue, because access to chapter 7 is now
means tested. For this reason, we confine ourselves to cases prior to the
date in 2005 when the Act’s provisions took effect.70
How important are homestead exemptions in determining the size
of the haircuts on the amounts that physicians would otherwise have to
pay? The large haircuts identified in the TDI dataset are striking, both
because of their frequency and their size. Given the norm identified in the
blood money literature, these findings are especially surprising in light of
the low level of insurance coverage purchased by Texas physicians on
average.71
Gillie’s insight about asset protection and homestead exemptions
in state bankruptcy laws provides a potential explanation. If this
explanation is correct, it significantly limits the generalizability of the
Texas findings, because only a few other states have the same generous
exemptions as Texas.72
70

The Act was signed into law by President Bush on April 20, 2005 with the
provisions applying to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. See Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23. See also Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 175–99 (2007).
71
See Baker, supra note 16, at 297-98 quoting a plaintiff’s lawyer as
follows: “We have a case now where a doctor testified at his deposition that his
group got together and they consciously made a decision to have million dollar
policies despite the fact that they are obstetricians and they know that their
exposure is greater, because they understood that if they only carried a million
dollars, the case would settle for a million dollars and they would be better off.
And under those circumstances, where someone has made that kind of a conscious
decision to be underinsured, I would feel less compunction about going after them,
and the client probably would also.”
Note the hypothetical nature of the claim. On close analysis, very few of
the Connecticut lawyers’ statements are inconsistent with a more straightforward
rational actor explanation, as Gilles has previously noted. See Gilles, supra note
17, at 666 (“whatever their moral beliefs may be, the self-interest of plaintiffs’
attorneys appears sufficient to explain the professional norm to which most of
them subscribe”).
72
Interestingly, Florida is the only other state with similarly public medical
malpractice claim payment literature though the data have not been as fully mined
as the Texas data. See generally Neil Vidmara, Kara MacKillop & Paul Lee,
Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-Verdict and Pre-Suit
Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (2006) (finding substantial post-judgement
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A conclusion that bankruptcy exemptions drive the Texas haircut
results, however, is premature. Such a conclusion requires a more rigorous
statistical analysis than is possible with data from a single jurisdiction. To
examine this hypothesis, we require data from multiple jurisdictions to be
able to compare insurance limits in states with generous exemptions to the
insurance limits observed in states with more modest bankruptcy
protections. That is the primary contribution of this Article.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We examine three data sources each of which contains slightly
different information relevant to our hypothesis. Our theory relies on the
claim from the quantitative TDI research and the qualitative claims of the
blood money literature that doctors generally will not be forced to pay out
of pocket to satisfy settlements and judgments even if the latter exceed the
doctor’s insurance policy limit unless the doctor is perceived as having
under-insured. The desire to avoid the risk of paying out of pocket due to a
violation of the adequate insurance norm is likely to be decreasing in the
ability of doctors to protect their assets through other mechanisms, such as
bankruptcy law. If these assumptions are correct, we should find that, all
other things equal, settlements (pre or post judgment) should be lower in
states that have more generous bankruptcy exemptions. We test this
implication using data from the National Practitioner Data Bank, finding
support.
Second, given the validation of those assumptions, our model
predicts that demand for insurance should be lower in jurisdictions with
more generous bankruptcy exemptions. This implies that prices for medical
malpractice policies should be lower in these jurisdictions for a given
coverage level.73 Using data from the Medical Liability Monitor, we find
haircuts). Because both Texas and Florida have such unusually generous
bankruptcy exemptions, the results from both data sets may not generalize
nationally.
73
Take the standard result that a monopolistic competitor sets marginal
revenue equal to marginal cost when maximizing profit (see Andreu Mas-Colell,
Michael Winston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory, at 386 (1995)). If we
express marginal revenue in terms of the elasticity of demand, we have

MRi

Pi 1

1
ei

(see Alph Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical

Economics, 3rd ed., 357 (1984)), where

ei is the elasticity for demand for good i,
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results supporting this hypothesis. Last, to validate the model’s implication
that doctors will choose lower coverage levels when bankruptcy
protections are stronger, we examine data from an insolvent medical
malpractice insurer that offered policies in many different states. The
results from this dataset are consistent with the prediction of the model.
In several of the specifications discussed below we also include
controls for differences in state tort law. We use Ronen Avraham’s
Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) which is a
comprehensive reference of changes in state tort law from 1980 to the
present.74 The DSTLR 4th edition contains information about state caps on
punitive damages, caps on total damages, and caps on non-economic
damages if those caps apply to medical malpractice cases. We also include
information on which states limited joint and several liability and a control
for those states that enacted periodic payment statutes forcing plaintiffs to
receive certain settlements intermittently rather than as a lump sum. We
include controls for states that have changed the standard necessary to
receive punitive damages and states that divide punitive damages between
the plaintiff and the state. We include an indicator variable if the state has
modified the collateral sources rule in order to prevent plaintiffs from
collecting from both a defendant and insurance. We include an indicator
variable if the state has capped contingent fees. Finally we include an
indicator variable if the state has created a patients’ compensation fund to
pay damages in support of plaintiff verdicts above a certain threshold
amount.
These reforms are typically enacted in clusters making it
impossible to determine the independent effect of each reform. Since we
are interested in the impact of homestead exemptions, which to our
knowledge have never been part of a tort reform package, we do not
attempt to disentangle the individual effects of the tort reform laws in the
Avraham database.

we can solve for the price of good i as Pi

MCi
. Thus, for a fixed marginal
1
1
ei

cost, it is easy to see that a larger (in magnitude) elasticity of demand will lead to a
lower price (since elasticities are negative).
74
Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 5th), UNIV.
OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER NO. E555, May 2014,
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902711.
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VI. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DATASETS
A. NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BASE
The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) includes information
on all payments made to settle a claim or a judgment against a physician in
the medical malpractice context. Reporting is mandatory under the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.75 Given the nationwide scope of
this mandate, the NPDB is a comprehensive dataset.
The database contains information on over 200,000 medical
malpractice payments made on behalf of practitioners in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia.76 This national dataset helps us evaluate whether
the low payments observed in the TDI data are common in states with
generous bankruptcy protections. We use the data between 1990 (the start
of the database) and 2005 to avoid the national bankruptcy law change. We
also drop the handful of trials in the sample though this does not affect our
results. In Figure 1 we present the distribution of NPDB claims across
states.

75

42 U.S.C. 11101.
The NPDB has several well-known limitations. See Eric Helland, Jonathan
Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Data Watch: Tort-Uring the Data, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 207 (2005) (discussing the NPDB).
76
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Figure 1: Distribution of Settlements in National Practitioners’
Database.
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The summary statistics for the NPDB are given below. The data
also contain information on the type of medical error, the doctor’s age and
the year in which the doctor received his or her medical degree.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for the NPDB
Mean
Payment amount
Unlimited Homestead
Exemption (1=yes)
Physician age
Graduation Year
Pre 1940
1940-49
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
Post 1999
Medical Error
Diagnosis
Anesthesia
Surgery
Medication
IV/blood
Obstetrics
Treatment
Monitoring
Equipment
Behavior
State minimum policy limit
per occurrence
Observations

213,555
0.18

Standard
Deviation
351,814
0.39

47.99

10.48

0.00
0.03
0.11
0.24
0.31
0.25
0.05
0.00

0.06
0.16
0.31
0.43
0.46
0.43
0.22
0.02

0.34
0.03
0.28
0.06
0.00
0.08
0.18
0.01
0.00
0.00
92,178

0.47
0.17
0.45
0.23
0.06
0.26
0.38
0.12
0.06
0.02
230,135
197,695
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The estimated model is:

where the homestead exemption variable is an indicator taking the value of
1 if a state has an unlimited exemption and zero otherwise. X includes the
doctor specific controls mentioned above, state tort law controls and the
alleged injury. The model also includes individual year dummies to
account for any nationwide trends in settlement amounts.
The results are presented in Table 3. We find that an unlimited
homestead exemption is associated with lower settlement payments. We
find that the settlement payments are $34,000 lower in the NPBD, and the
percentage impact is about 14 percent. When estimated in logs rather than
levels, in column 3 we find that point estimate declines slightly to a 9
percent drop but continues to be negative and significant.

Table 3: NPDB Settlement Results
Variables
Payment
ln(Payment)
Unlimited
-33,752***
-0.10***
Homestead
(6,983)
(0.03)
Exemption
Percentage Change
-14%
-9%
in Settlement
Amount
Observations
189,814
189,814
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our estimates from the NPDB confirm that Texas and the other
states with unlimited bankruptcy exemptions exhibit systematically lower
settlements. The magnitude of this reduction is statistically significant and
quantitatively large.
While the regression results presented in Table 3 above may suffer
from omitted variable bias, it does suggest that this set of states, including
Texas, is systematically different for some reason. The characteristic that
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these states have an unlimited homestead exemption may be correlated
with some other unaccounted for factor that drives settlement amounts
down. In some sense, this alone is enough to draw into question the extent
to which the Texas settlement and haircut results can be generalized.
Texas, and the other states in this group, are systematically different from
the majority of states in the U.S.
It is not generally possible to guarantee that the unlimited
homestead exemption is driving this result, short of running some kind of
randomized policy experiment where homestead exemptions are randomly
assigned to states. Given the limited in-state variation in the exemption
amounts within this set of states, it is not even possible to examine a socalled natural experiment that proceeds as if the policy change is
conditionally exogenous to other things affecting settlement amounts in the
states. However, we can provide some confidence by examining the other
predictions generated by our model above; namely, if the homestead
exemption provides an additional avenue by which doctors protect their
income, the elasticity of demand for the insurance should increase,
lowering the equilibrium price for coverage in this set of states. Also, if the
presence of these exemptions is driving the lower settlement amounts, we
should observe systematically lower insurance limits in this set of states.
B. MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR SURVEY
Our model, given the assumption, that bankruptcy protections lead
to lower settlements, suggests that demand for medical malpractice
insurance should be lower in jurisdictions with large protections, which
should lead to lower prices in those jurisdictions. To examine the impact of
homestead exemptions on premiums, we turn to an annual survey
conducted by Medical Liability Monitor.
The survey began in 1991 and our data ends in 2002. The survey
collects data on the premium for a hypothetical policy offering $1 million
in coverage for a claim and $3 million per year. The data provides
information at the company level for different regions within a state (i.e.
major cities) and for three specialties: internal medicine, general surgery
and obstetrics- gynecology. Thus the unit of observation for our analysis is
the state- region-company-year for each of the three specialties. For
example the data would provide us with the premium for an OBGYN in
Los Angeles in 1999 offered by the Doctors Company. Since medical
professional liability is not experience rated, the premiums reflect the price
faced by all doctors of a particular specialty that the insurer is willing to
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insure.77
We examine the data at the company level for two reasons. First,
companies enter and exit the survey in various years and for various
reasons. We cannot determine if the company exited the market completely
or simply did not report data for some region or specialty. Though we
have no reason to suspect that reporting is correlated with homestead
exemptions, to control for any composition bias that might result from
differential reporting, we include company-region-state fixed effects.
Second, the state-region fixed effects allow us to control for sizeable
differences in litigation rates across different regions in states, something
that none of our datasets allow us to control for directly.
Because the data is at the company-region level, we have a
different number of observations across states, with California having the
largest number of company-regions. We provide the breakdown of the
sample by state in Figure 2.

77
See Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and
Disappearing Doctors? 28 Regulation 24 (2005) for more details on MLM data.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Policies Observed in Medical Liability
Monitor Data
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In Table 4 we present the summary statistics from the MLM
survey. There is very wide variation in premiums faced by doctors, with
the lowest being a $14 per year premium offered in 1992 to general
surgeons in rural Tennessee, while the highest premium was offered to
OBGYNs in 1991 in Detroit ($214,301).

Table 4: Summary Statistics for the
Medical Liability Monitor data (1991-2002)
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Real Annual Premium
28,978
26,020
Unlimited Homestead
0.17
0.38
Exemption
Minimum Policy Limit
61,304
163,905
Per Occurrence
Observations
6,303
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares and is specified as

where premium is the annual premium identified in the data, unlimited
homestead exemption retains its meaning, r are the year indicators, ߮ are
state-region fixed effects, X includes indicators for the three specialties.
The results are presented in Table 5. We again estimate the model
in logs and levels. We find that premiums are on average about $3,300
lower, for the same amount of coverage, in states with unlimited
homestead exemptions than states without an unlimited exemption. This
represents about a 9.7% reduction in premiums. In column three we
estimate the model using the log of premiums and again find a reduction in
the premiums in states with unlimited homestead exemptions. In this case
the estimated effect is smaller, about 3.6%.

Table 5: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions
Variables
Premium
ln(Premium)
Unlimited
-3,372***
-0.04*
Homestead
(1,081)
(0.02)
Exemption
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Percentage Change in
-9.7%
-3.6%
Premium
Observations
6,285
6,285
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year
dummies, doctor specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find that physicians in states with unlimited homestead
exemptions systematically have lower premiums, suggesting a reduction in
demand for insurance by doctors in those states.
C. INSOLVENT INSURER
To further investigate the validity of our theoretical claims, the last
dataset we use includes all closed claims from a large medical malpractice
insurer that provided policies throughout much of the United States until it went
insolvent in the mid-2000s. These data include information on the payments
made, the (per occurrence and annual aggregate) policy limits, the physician
specialty, and details about the injury. We provide summary statistics in Table 6
That insolvent insurer’s data has several advantages over publicly
available medical malpractice data such as the TDI data, as well as the
comparable datasets for Florida. For our purposes, the most important is
that the insurer has claim data from multiple states, including several
without homestead exemptions. Unlike the National Practitioner Database
(NPDB), the insolvent insurer’s data also contains information on claims
that were closed without payment (either because they were unilaterally
dropped by the plaintiff or there was a defense verdict at trial), as well as
information on policy limits. The insolvent insurer data also contains
information on the specialty of the doctor involved and the type of injury.

Table 6: Insolvent Medical Malpractice Insurer Data Summary
Mean
Standard Deviation
Settlement Amount
45,701
174,760
Aggregate Policy
2,274,695
2,147,062
Limit
Per Occurrence
548,477
485,886
Policy Limit
Observations
38,324
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While the insurer sold policies throughout much of the country, its
policies were not evenly distributed across states. Figure 3 provides the
distribution of policies by state observed in this dataset. For our purposes,
the value of this data is somewhat limited in that the only states with
unlimited bankruptcy exemptions for which we observe any settlements are
Texas and Florida, with the latter providing relatively few observations. At
a minimum, these data can show if Texas and Florida are systematically
different from the rest of the states in the dataset in terms of insuring
practices and settlement behavior. Some of this heterogeneity is likely
associated with the bankruptcy provisions in those states given our NPDB
results; however, confidence in this claim is necessarily limited given the
data availability.
Figure 3: Distribution of Policies Observed in Insolvent Medical
Malpractice Insurer Data
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We begin by estimating the impact of unlimited homestead
exemptions on the total policy limit78 chosen by doctors using the following
78

The results are qualitatively similar if we instead use the per
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specification,

where policy limit is the per occurrence policy limit in 2005 dollars,
unlimited homestead exemption equals one if the state in question has an
unlimited homestead exemption, r are year indicator variables, X is the set
of control variables include state tort laws and indicator variables for the
different specialty of the doctor involved in the lawsuit.
The results are presented in Table 7. The model is estimated in
both levels and logs. The results indicate that the physicians sued in states
with an unlimited homestead exemption have a 65% lower policy limit
than those sued in states without the unlimited homestead exemption.
There are two possible effects that could be driving this result. First,
physicians may be systematically choosing lower policy limits in the states
in which they can protect their assets from a judgment. Second, the
selection of cases may be different in states with unlimited exemptions.
This second effect would tend to bias the result toward zero, however, as
plaintiffs’ attorneys would be more likely to pursue cases in which the
doctor had, for whatever reason, selected a higher policy limit. Thus, this
possible selection effect likely makes our conclusion about the impact of
bankruptcy exemptions even stronger.

Table 7: Policy Limit Regressions Insolvent Insurer Data
Variables
Policy Limit
ln(Policy Limit)
Unlimited
-1,781,226***
-1.19***
Homestead
(142,506)
(0.04)
Exemption
Percentage Change in
65.3%
-70%
Policy Limit
Observations
36,441
36,441
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort
reforms, physician specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

occurrence policy limit as the dependent variable.
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In Table 8 we estimate the impact of unlimited homestead
exemptions on settlements using a Tobit regression. A Tobit regression
corrects for situations in which the dependent variable is truncated in some
way.79 This is important in our insolvent insurer data because there are 327
cases (about .08%) in which the payment exceeds the policy limit. For
some of those cases, the excess amount paid, if any, is not identified. It is
unclear why the excess is reported in some cases but not in others, so we
err on the side of caution and treat the observations as truncated at the
policy limit if the excess is not reported. The results are robust to excluding
the missing observations and estimating the model using ordinary least
squares. The model is specified as,

where settlement amount is the payment by the insurer, unlimited
homestead exemption retains its meaning from above, r are year indicator
variables, X includes controls for specialty, the severity of the injury as
determined by the insurer (classified as minor, major, death emotional
injuries, or no injury), and whether the injured party is a child.
The results are presented in Table 8. In column two we estimate
the model with all of the available cases prior to 2005 and find that the
presence of an unlimited homestead exemption reduces settlement amounts
by over $19,000. As would be expected, the results are larger when we
confine ourselves to those cases which settle for a positive value rather
than being closed without payment.80 The impact rises to $70,000 per case,
which represents a 26% drop in payment amounts as compared to
settlements in states without an unlimited homestead exemption. By
contrast when the model is estimated including the $0 payment cases, we
find a 44% reduction in payments suggesting a significant number of cases
are dropped in the face of an unlimited homestead exemption. In column 3
we estimate the model using the log of the settlement amount which also
79

See the entry on Tobit Regressions, StataCorp. 2009. Stata 11 Base
Reference Manual. College Station, TX: Stata Press and Wooldridge, J. M. 2009.
Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 4th ed. Cincinnati, OH: SouthWestern.
80
One reason for estimating the model using only the cases closed with a
positive payment is to allow for better comparison of the results using the insolvent
insurer data with results using the Texas and NPDB data, because both of those
datasets do not include cases closed with zero payment.
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eliminates the cases settling for no payment. We find that the homestead
exemption is associated with about a 20% decline in payments to plaintiffs.

Table 8: Settlement Amounts Insolvent Insurer Data
Variables
Settlement
Settlement
ln(Settlement
Amount
Amount > 0
Amount)
Unlimited
-19,983***
-70,882***
-0.21**
Homestead
(4,143)
(20,911)
(0.08)
Exemption
Percentage
-44%
-26%
-19%
Change in
Settlement
Amount
Observations
36,442
6,402
6,402
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether
victim was child
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
The results from our insolvent insurer data indicate that doctors in
states with an unlimited homestead exemption systematically pay out less
in settlements and select lower policy limits. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that doctors in these states have greater bargaining power in
settlement negotiations and, hence, decide to insure less, because their
assets are at less risk. Note that these settlement reductions line up
nicely with the proportional size of the haircuts identified in the TDI data,
supporting our concern about the generalizability of the findings from the
Texas research. While the results are consistent with the bankruptcy
exemption hypothesis, they could also be driven by other peculiar aspects
of Texas and Florida.
Thus, again, at a minimum, our results suggest that Texas and
Florida are peculiar relative to the other states covered in the dataset. This
draws into question any attempt to extrapolate from these states to predict
what occurs in other markets with respect to medical malpractice insurance
policies and settlements. Further, the results are at least consistent with our
hypothesis that the existence of an unlimited homestead exemption is
important in understanding the dynamics of the Texas insurance market
and the settlement environment in that jurisdiction.
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VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAVEATS
In this section we explore two robustness checks on our results.
The first is to include state minimum policy requirements in the regression.
During the sample period several states required doctors to have a specified
minimum insurance policy. Clearly this will affect the policy limits chosen
by the doctor and may impact settlement negotiations. The concern that led
us to first analyze the data without considering these minimum insurance
requirements is that plaintiffs’ attorneys may lobby to have minimum
policy limits in those states with unlimited homestead exemptions, thus
leading to an endogenously-driven correlation between the requirements
and the unlimited exemption. We have no anecdotal evidence of this, and
states with unlimited homestead exemptions do not appear to be
systematically overrepresented among the states with minimum policy
requirements. Nevertheless, we treat the results including the minimum
requirements as a robustness check, rather than including the limits in our
primary specifications.
A. MINIMUM COVERAGE REGULATIONS
Between 1988 and 2008 13 states had some sort of minimum
liability coverage for doctors. The limits are summarized in Table 9. The
amounts are typically small relative to the policy limits found in the
insolvent insurer data; although one state, Pennsylvania, does require one
million dollars of per incident coverage.

Table 9: Summary of State Rules Covering Minimum Liability
Insurance
State
Rule
Years
AK
none
1988-2008
AL
none
1988-2009
AR
none
1988-2010
AZ
none
1988-2011
CA
none
1988-2012
CO
none
1988-2013
CT
none
1988-1994
CT
$500,000
1995-2008
DE
none
1988-2008
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FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PA
PA
PA
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$100,000
none
none
none
none
none
$250,000
none
none
none
$100,000
none
none
none
none
$500,000
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
$1,000,000
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
$100,000
$300,000
$400,000
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1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-1994, 1998-2001
1995-1997, 2002-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-1996
1997-1998
1999-2000

2016

PA
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
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$500,000
$1,000,000
none
$100,000
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
$50,000
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2001-2002
2003-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008
1988-2008

For each of the regressions presented in section 6 above, we now
include the minimum policy limit (which is either zero for states without
the limit or the limit itself) for the relevant years.
In Table 10 we estimate the NPDB regressions including minimum
policy requirements.

Table 10: NPDB Settlement Regressions with Minimum Policy
Limits
Variables
Payment
ln(Payment)
Unlimited
-22,312***
-0.02
Homestead
(8,181)
(0.04)
Exemption
Minimum Policy
0.05***
0.000***
Limit Per Occurrence
(0.01)
(0.00)
Percentage Change in
-10%
-2%
Settlement Amount
Observations
189,814
189,814
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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While the magnitudes of our homestead exemption effects decline
somewhat, they are still negative and the results in the regressions using
the level of the settlement is still statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. The minimum policy limit amounts are positively correlated with
settlement amounts. Despite the decline in coefficient magnitude, these
results are generally consistent with those presented above.
In table 11 we estimate our premium regressions using the MLM
data, taking into account the minimum policy requirements. We again find
that states with unlimited homestead exemptions have lower annual
premiums. The impact is very similar to the results obtained when we do
not include the minimum policy requirements.

Table 11: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions with
Minimum Policy Limits
Variables
Premium
ln(Premium)
Unlimited
-3,377***
-0.04*
Homestead
(1,082)
(0.02)
Exemption
Minimum Policy
0.001
0.000
Limit Per Occurrence
(0.003)
(0.000)
Percentage Change in
-10%
-3.6%
Premium
Observations
6,285
6,285
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year
dummies, doctor specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of our policy limit specification using the insolvent
insurer are presented in Table 12. Even when we include controls for
minimum policy requirements, which do cause a statistically significant
increase in the level of coverage chosen by doctors, we still find that
unlimited homestead exemptions reduce the amount of coverage selected
by doctors. Moreover this effect is quite large, with doctors in states with
unlimited homestead exemption states selecting 61% less coverage than in
states in which less asset protection is available. These results are virtually
identical to those discussed above.
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Table 12: Policy Limit Regression with Minimum Coverage
Control
Variables
Policy Limit
ln(Policy Limit)
Unlimited
-1,666,266***
-1.11***
Homestead
(149,933)
(0.04)
Exemption
Minimum Policy
0.22**
0.00***
Limit
(0.09)
(0.00)
Percentage Change
-61.1%
-67%
in Policy Limit
Observations
36,441
36,441
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort
reforms, physician specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 13 we estimate the settlement amount specifications using
the insolvent insurer data. As predicted, minimum policy requirements
increase the amount of settlement in all specifications. We continue to find
that unlimited homestead exemptions reduce the amount of settlement
when we include zero payment cases. When we drop cases with zero
payments from the data, the impact of unlimited exemptions is negative but
not significant. Finally when we use the log of settlement amounts the
coefficient on unlimited homestead exemptions is not significant and flips
sign. As explained below the instability of these results may be the result of
the reduction in sample size when the zero payment cases are excluded.

Table 13: Settlement Amounts Insurer Database with Minimum
Policy Limit
Variables
Settlement
Settlement Ln(settlement
Amount
Amount>0
Amount)
Unlimited Homestead
-10,649**
-27,324
0.07
Exemption
(4,939)
(24,652)
(0.10)
Minimum Policy
0.01***
0.06***
0.00***
Limit Per Occurrence
(0.00)
(0.017)
(0.00)
Percentage Change in
-21%
-10%
7.7%
Settlement Amount
Observations
36,442
6,402
6,402
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Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether
victim was child
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of this robustness check are not as comforting. While
we continue to find a negative effect of unlimited homestead exemptions
on settlement amounts in the level regressions, the log specification
generates a coefficient that is essentially zero. Further, even in the level
specifications, the magnitude of the coefficients declines substantially.
The results of our first robustness check indicate that, while
minimum policy limits do increase coverage amounts and settlement
payments, the impact of unlimited homestead exemptions retains its
significance in most specifications. We now turn to a second inquiry: Do
partial homestead exemptions generate similar, though smaller in
magnitude, effects?
B. IMPACT OF PARTIAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
In this section we examine the impact of partial homestead
exemptions that allow some sheltering of assets. The classification is far
less clear cut that the unlimited homestead exemption, because unlimited
states have very few restrictions on the nature and the amount of home
equity that can be protected. By contrast, states with partial exemptions
often have specific qualifications. For example, Connecticut allows the
exemption only for certain hospital debts and Maine requires dependents to
qualify. We have no systematic way to capture these specific
qualifications, and so we treat the partial homestead exemption as a
dummy variable, recognizing that it will be estimated with more noise than
our unlimited homestead exception variable.
We estimate the NPBD regressions including indicator variables
for both unlimited and partial homestead exemptions. The results are
presented in Table 14. Consistent with our original findings, we estimate
that both kinds of exemptions are associated with lower settlements,
whether the payment is estimated in levels or logs. Interestingly, the effect
of partial exemptions is smaller than the effect of unlimited exemptions, at
least in the level specification, and this difference is statistically significant.
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Table 14: Settlement Amount Regressions NPDB with Both
Unlimited and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls
Variables
Payment
ln(Payment)
Unlimited
-46,803***
-0.24***
Homestead
(7,417)
(0.03)
Exemption
Partial Homestead
-21,650***
-0.25***
Exemption
(7,017)
(0.03)
Percentage Change in
-19%
-22%
Settlement Amount
Observations
189,814
189,814
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find similar effects in the Medical Liability Monitor regressions,
with the unlimited homestead exemption generating a negative effect that is
larger in magnitude than the effect associated with a partial homestead
exemption at least in the level specifications. Given that a partial exemption
has much less utility as an asset protection mechanism, this is what our model
predicts. The coefficients in the log specifications are essentially equal. The
results are generally not very precise though, so while the point estimates are
largely consistent with theory, we cannot conclude with confidence that the
results could not be the result of random associations in the data.

Table 15: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions with
Both Unlimited and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls
Variables
Premium
ln(Premium)
Unlimited Homestead
-3,378
-0.01
Exemption
(3,216)
(0.10)
Partial Homestead
-6.00
0.03
Exemption
(2,987)
(0.09)
Percentage Change in
-10%
-0%
Premium
Observations
6,285
6,285
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year
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dummies, doctor specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of our policy limit regressions are shown in Table 16.
Using the insolvent insurer data, we find similar impacts from the
unlimited exemptions, but we find positive and significant impacts of
partial exemptions on policy limits. This is surprising since the omitted
category is no limit. Thus, the results suggest that the highest policy limits
chosen are chosen in states with partial homestead exemptions.

Table 16: Policy Limit Regressions with Both Unlimited and
Limited Homestead Exemption Controls
Variables
Policy Limit
ln(Policy Limit)
Unlimited
-1,715,926***
-1.18***
Homestead
(143,053)
(0.04)
Exemption
Partial Homestead
678,991***
0.11***
Exemption
(135,485)
(0.04)
Percentage Change in
-75%
-60%
Limit
Observations
36,441
36,441
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort
reforms, physician specialty dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of our settlement regressions are shown in Table 17.
The first column reports the results using all of the cases in the insolvent
insurer data. The second column reports the results when we eliminate the
zero payment cases. The third column reports the results using the log of
the settlement amount. In all three specifications both the unlimited and the
partial exemptions are associated with lower settlement amounts than states
without any exemption, although the impact of the partial exemptions is
not significant when we eliminate the zero payment cases. These results are
consistent with our hypothesis that defendants are advantaged in settlement
negotiations when they have the ability to shield assets from a judgment.
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Table 17: Settlement Amount Regressions with Both Unlimited
and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls
Variables
Settlement
Settlement
Ln(settlement
Amount
Amount>0
Amount)
Unlimited
-22,671***
-72,921***
-0.26***
Homestead
(4,178)
(21,038)
(0.08)
Exemption
Partial Homestead
-21,392***
-18,068
-0.40***
Exemption
(4,347)
(20,627)
(0.08)
Percentage Change
-45%
-27%
-23%
in Settlement
Observations
36,442
6,402
6,402
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether
victim was child
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although somewhat less precise, our estimates including both
unlimited and partial homestead exemptions are consistent with the general
hypothesis that the ability to shield assets increases defendant doctors
bargaining power in settlement negotiation and thus leads doctors to
choose lower policy limits, at least in unlimited exemption states.
Clearly, the weakest of our empirical results are those estimated
using the insolvent insurer dataset. The limited variation in the unlimited
homestead exemption is a concern, as is the relatively large effects we find.
Establishing the link between homestead exemptions and policy limits,
however, is crucial to validating our theoretical hypothesis. There is only
one other dataset, of which we are aware, that includes policy limit
information: the 1988 Physicians Practice Costs and Income Survey (1988
PPCIS).
The PPCIS is a cross-sectional survey of physicians conducted for
the Health Care Financing Administration. The survey includes responses
from 3.505 physicians (a 61% response rate) drawn from a stratified
random sample of physicians from the American Medical Association's
1988Physician Master File. The survey was conducted between July 1989
and March 1990. In addition to its broader sample, a benefit of this dataset
is that it is not conditioned on physicians who have been sued. Instead, it is
a sample of all physicians.

44

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 22.1

For our purposes the key questions concern the physician’s per
occurrence policy limit, the total limit on all events in a year, the premium
paid by the physician, and whether the physician had dropped his or her
insurance (i.e., whether she has “gone bare”). Table 18 provides summary
statistics for the PPCIS.

Table 18: PPCIS Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Per Occurrence Limit
1,060,940
Total Limit
2,638,857
Premium
17,839
No Coverage
0.01

Standard Deviation
1,109,691
2,298,499
28,074
0.07

If we regress each of these outcomes on our unlimited bankruptcy
homestead exemption indicator, we get the results contained in Table 19.

Table 19: PPCIS Regression Results
Variable
Occurrence Total Policy Premium
No
Policy
Limit
Coverage
Limit
Unlimited
-109,075**
1,396
0.013**
Homestead
(42,982)
465,826***
(1,457)
(0.006)
Exemption
(81,841)
Percentage
-10%
-18%
8%
130%
Change in
Outcome
Observations
3,335
3,231
3,400
3,489
Control Variables Include: Physician age, sex dummies, and
specialty dummies
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
This set of results supports our earlier results on the effects of
unlimited homestead exemptions on policy limits, and provides a new
result that is consistent with the theoretical idea, namely, physicians are
more willing to go without medical malpractice insurance when they have
the protection of unlimited homestead exemptions. In this dataset,
however, we do not find a price effect consistent with our theory.
Specifically, we find no statistically significant relationship between the
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existence of an unlimited homestead exemption and the price paid for
insurance. On net, the results on policy specific outcomes in the insolvent
insurer dataset and in the PPCIS data are largely consistent with our theory
but some inconsistencies and problems with each dataset provide some
room for skepticism. The results on premiums from the Medical Liability
Monitor improve confidence somewhat, but more research on this
phenomenon is clearly needed.
These results on settlements are in line with those found in the
Texas dataset. This suggests that the large size of the haircuts identified in
that dataset may result from Texas’s unlimited homestead exemption. At a
minimum, these results suggest caution is necessary when generalizing
from the results found in the TDI data about the medical malpractice
insurance market and settlement dynamics in medical malpractice cases.
Although our results are broadly consistent with the substitution
theory we put forth above, causal inference in this context is limited given
the limited within jurisdiction variation we observe in bankruptcy
exemptions. It is possible that the true driving variables in these
relationships are merely correlated with the bankruptcy exemptions, but
these exemptions themselves do not cause the behavior we observe. While
we have advanced a plausible theory consistent with these findings, other
as yet unarticulated hypotheses may be even more plausible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is a puzzle as to why plaintiffs do not go after defendants’
personal assets beyond insurance limits. While for a typical personal injury
case, it may be plausible to assume that defendants have few assets,
medical malpractice cases are different, given the affluence of physicians.
However, the Texas closed claims research suggests that plaintiffs settle
for policy limits in those cases too. If that is true, in equilibrium, we should
find physicians reducing the amount of insurance that they buy. The
degree to which this is a viable strategy, however, is limited by the
possibility that plaintiffs will pursue personal assets if limits are too low.
While it has been suggested that the determination of adequate
insurance coverage is a question of fairness or morality, an alternate
explanation is that plaintiffs are simply being pragmatic. When it is
difficult to get at assets, the plaintiffs settle for the insurance policy limits,
leading physicians to purchase lower limits in the future. Instead, when it is
more difficult to protect assets, plaintiffs are more willing to go after those
assets, leading physicians to purchase more insurance coverage.
Using variation in state homestead exemptions in bankruptcy, we
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test this hypothesis and find support for it in three separate datasets. In
addition to adding some insight into the blood money phenomenon, these
results suggest that earlier research focusing on haircuts in Texas medical
malpractice cases may not be representative. That is, it is plausible that the
large haircuts and low insurance limits found in that work are the result of
Texas homestead protection laws, which are qualitatively different than
those in most other states. At a minimum, our results suggest that there is
something different about Texas when it comes to medical malpractice
insurance practices and settlement dynamics. This implies that any
extrapolation from work using the TDI data to general conclusions about
medical malpractice is problematic. This highlights the importance of using
multi-jurisdictional datasets when doing empirical work on medical
malpractice.

